Privately,  some US officials considered the joint effort to be little more than obstructionism. They were annoyed at Brazil’s behavior, but they were even more concerned that this episode seemed to be the merely the latest in a series of Turkish actions that undermined Washington’s policies in the Middle East. There is a bitter irony in the emergence of an increasingly hostile relationship between Washington and Ankara, for several generations of US policy makers sought the closest possible ties with Turkey. Since the late 1940s, American officials had regarded Turkey as an important, loyal US ally. Throughout the Cold War, a succession of US administrations viewed that country as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s indispensable southeastern anchor. That belief even caused American leaders to ignore or excuse Ankara’s sometimes troubling behavior in the international arena, most notably its aggressive territorial claims regarding Greek islands in the Aegean and the 1974 invasion and ongoing occupation of northern Cyprus. In the immediate post – Cold War period, many members of the American foreign policy community insisted that Turkey was a more important US security partner than ever before. Paul Wolfowitz, who would become deputy secretary of defense under President George W. Bush, was one of several prominent experts who argued that there were a handful of “keystone” or “pivotal” powers in the international system, and that Turkey was high on that list. Pro- Turkish analysts insisted that in a post – Cold War environment, Turkey not only remained NATO’s southeastern anchor, it was now also a crucial bridge between Europe and the Middle East and a valuable conduit for Western, secular influence in much of the Muslim world, especially the Central Asian republics that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. A Lengthening List of Quarrels Despite such high expectations (at least on the American side) for a close security partnership, trouble in the relationship has been building steadily for many years. 

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad surprised not only many Westerners but also many Iranians when, during his first speech at the United Nations, he prayed for the hasty return of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, Shi‘i Islam's messianic figure. Demonstrating his priorities, he repeated the prayer in December 2007 when addressing Arab leaders at the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting in Doha but did not object when they described the Persian Gulf as Arab, a diplomatic swipe at Iran's place in the region. Ahmadinejad's messianism is no ploy; it is very serious indeed. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, chairman of the Guardian Council, credits Ahmadinejad with "being inspired by God."

The inspiration for Ahmadinejad's thinking can be found in traditional Shi‘ism. As with other monotheistic religions, Shi‘i teachings promise the return of a messiah. For Twelver Shi‘a, the messiah will be Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam, who went into occultation in 874 CE and is expected to return before the Day of Judgment to lead the righteous against the forces of evil. Such ideas pervade Iranian culture, even beyond the Islamic context. The idea of the Mahdi has historical precedence, for example, in ancient Zoroastrian beliefs. Persian literature and poetry are awash with the notion of a promised savior. Abol-Ghasem Ferdowsi (935-1020), the author of Shahnameh (The book of kings), Iran's national epic, wrote that a "noble man" would appear in Iran from "whom will spread the religion of God to the four corners of the world."

Civilizational elite – is a new concept. Thus far  it does not exist. It is a combination of two qualities – deep assimilation of the particular civilizational culture (in the philosophical, religious, value levels) and the presence of a high degree “of drive,” persistently pushing people to the heights of power, prestige and influence. Modern liberalism channels passion exclusively in the area of economics and business, creating a preference for a particular social elevator and it is a particular type of personality (which is an American sociologist Yuri Slezkine called “mercurial type”) .

The Mercurial elite of globalism, “aviakochevniki” mondialist nomadism, sung by Jacques Attali, should be overthrown in favor of radically different types of elites. Each civilization can dominate, and other “worlds”, not only thievish, mercurial shopkeepers and  cosmopolitans.  Islamic elite is clearly another – an example of this we see in today’s Iran, where the policy (Mars) and economics (Mercury) are subject to  spiritual authority, of the Ayatollah (Saturn).

Talking about geopolitical coherence for a country that has forgotten all the strategic agreements of understanding with Jamahiriya’s Libya seems excessive to me. Italy urges to be able to identify its own strategic paradigm, and possibly place it in the changing world. Our previous government stood out for its excellent close relations with Russia, with the former Soviet bloc countries like Belarus, with Turkey, with North Africa (before the illegitimate aggression of Libya by NATO ), with China… Now we have instead a technical government imposed on us by the Europeanist line, composed from person who worked for NATO, finance and multinationals. Our own prime minister Mario Monti has been called “the man of Goldman Sachs”. It is clear that these conditions do not grant the formulation of a coherent own geopolitical line. With regard to the Padanian independentism, it had its political representation in “Lega Nord”, a party that was in government with the previous executive. As its first instances were to be ascribed to secessionism, it now proposing a less improbable federalism. However from the resignation of former premier Silvio Berlusconi the popularity of “Lega Nord” is declining, and in these days were consumed a series of scandals (whose timing might seem “artificial”) that have seen the collapse of its credibility. As regards the phenomenon known as "neo-borbonic" (but you can say the same about "neo-Habsburg"... ), this is not inserted in the political scene at all, but results from a fair recovery of regional cultural identity and from a more honest confrontation with the flaws of the process of unification of the nation, founded on liberal, capitalist and anti-popular ideological basis (in this regards the opinion of Antonio Gramsci about the “Southern question” are illuminating). We have examined the subject in some of our seminars, analyzing the relationship between the Italian Reunification and geopolitics, emphasizing the Anglo-Saxon interference in the politics of Piedmont, and the influence it exerted on ideological groups that have played a key role in the unification process, contextualizing the event in the global scenario that the British Empire was shaping according to its business interests, since the Crimean War (see "The Two Sicilies and the Crimean War” by Angelo D'Ambra, Nomos III and Nomos IV). Altough each independentist proposal found to be inadequate to the reality of facts and is definitely outdated compared to the necessity of creation of large strategic poles functional to the transition to multipolarism, we can not but recognize that local sovereignties were the first to be swallowed by the centripetal force of the mondialist process, which saw in the British trade policy the precursor of the next U.S. unipolarism. The Napoleonic Jacobinism on the one hand, and every liberal ideological derivative the other have played a prominent role in this process, now on behalf of France, now on behalf of England – in each case on behalf of an illuminist and ideological worldview, based on the dogmas of the Rule of law, of the economics divorced from organic or state constraints, of the need to create a global supranational organism. Anyway any recovery of the local culture is desired, although it must always be framed in a correct view of international politics, in a total alterglobalist proposal and, last but not least, in a healthy clarity of analysis to compare it objectively with reality , a feature that in most cases in these circles is missing.